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Abstract
Rational expectations is typically taken to mean that, conditional on the infor-
mation set and the relevant economic theory, the expectation formed by an economic
agent should be equal to its mathematical expectation. This is correct only when ac-
tual inﬂation is “linear” in the aggregate inﬂationary expectation or if it is non-linear
then forecasters are “small” and use “causal reasoning”. We show that if actual in-
ﬂa t i o ni sn o n - l i n e a ri ne x p e c t e di n ﬂation and (1) there are “large” forecasters, or,
(2) small/ large forecasters who use “evidential reasoning”, then the optimal fore-
cast does not equal the mathematical expectation of the variable being forecast. We
also show that when actual inﬂation is non-linear in aggregate inﬂation there might
be no solution if one identiﬁes rational expectations with equating the expectations
to the mathematical average, while there is a solution using the “correct” forecast-
ing rule under rational expectations. Furthermore, results suggest that published
forecasts of inﬂation may be systematically diﬀerent from the statistical averages of
actual inﬂation and output, on average, need not equal the natural rate. The paper
has fundamental implications for macroeconomic forecasting and policy, testing the
assumptions and implications of market eﬃciency and for rational expectations in
general.
Keywords: Non-linearities, large forecasters, evidential reasoning, rational expec-
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The assumption of rational expectations has been identiﬁed, almost exclusively, with the
requirement that the expectation formed by an economic agent of a random variable should
be equal to the mathematical expectation of that variable as given by the relevant model
and conditional on the agent’s information set. This result is derived, as in Muth (1961),
by assuming that a forecaster aims to minimize the sum of the squares of the forecasting
errors, an assumption that we retain in our model.
For the optimal forecast to be equal to the mathematical expectation, either of the
following two assumptions, A1 or A2, is crucial, but these are usually left implicit.
A1. Forecasters are “small” and they use “causal reasoning”
Forecasters are assumed to be small in the sense that their own forecast has no
practical signiﬁcance for the aggregate value of the variable being forecast. If small
forecasters fully understand this causal link, we then say that they use causal reason-
ing because they, correctly, perceive that their own forecast will not have a causal
aﬀect on the variable being forecast. We deﬁne an exogenous forecast to be the fore-
cast produced by a (small) forecaster who perceives that her own individual forecast
has no practical inﬂuence on the value of the random variable being forecast.
A2. Forecasters are “large” and they use “linear” inﬂation processes
The forecaster can be large, for instance, a central bank, who should perceive that its
forecast will signiﬁcantly aﬀect the value of variable being forecast1. However, the
process governing actual inﬂation is often taken to be a linear function of aggregate
inﬂationary expectations, either by assumption or on account of the structure of the
model, for instance in a linear-quadratic framework. The original exposition of Muth
(1961) also relied on a linear process for inﬂation2.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of these implicit assumptions
in macroeconomic forecasting, to relax them and to examine the resulting implications. We
s h o wt h a t ,i ng e n e r a l ,i fe i t h e ro ft h e s ea s s u m p tions is relaxed on its own, or in conjunction
with the other, the optimal forecast is no longer the mathematical expectation of the
variable. In particular, when the underlying inﬂation process is non-linear in aggregate
inﬂationary expectations then the optimal forecast is not the mathematical expectation of
1For instance, existing homeowners with mortgages as well as entrants into the housing market might
alter their plans in light of these forecasts. Credit, and credit rates, extended by commercial banks, and
the ﬁnancial and investment decisions of ﬁrms can also by potentially aﬀected by central bank forecasts.
2Muth (1961: pp. 317) makes the following assumptions. (1)The random disturbances are normally
distributed. (2)Certainty equivalence exists for the variables to be predicted. (3)The equations of the
system, including the expectations formulas, are linear.
1the variable under either of the following two cases. (1) Large forecasters. (2) Forecasters
(large or small) using non-causal reasoning. In particular, we examine the implications of
“evidential reasoning”, which is deﬁned below. We address each of these issues in turn.
1.1. “Non-Linearities” in Inﬂation
We relax the linear-quadratic framework, widely used in the literature and which generates
an inﬂation process that is linear in aggregate inﬂationary expectations. We do so in the
following two ways. First we examine the implications of a general, non-linear inﬂationary
process. Second, we construct an example of a non-linear inﬂation process by considering
the possibility of a “liquidity trap” in a standard aggregate demand - aggregate supply
model. In its classical form, the liquidity trap is a situation where an economy is caught
up in a recession and the nominal interest rates have been driven down to zero. This
eliminates the possibility of using monetary policy as a potent instrument.
Interest in the liquidity trap has revived in recent years due, in no small measure, to
the experience of Japan since 1990. There is also concern that Germany and France may
be heading in a similar direction. Because monetary policy is ineﬀective in a liquidity
trap, reliance must be placed on other policies, such as ﬁscal policy, exchange rate policy,
unconventional monetary policies or more fundamental structural policies; see for example
Blinder (2000). Furthermore, in light of the theoretical reformulation by Krugman (1998),
the liquidity trap has received new interest in its own right, see for instance, Dhami and
al-Nowaihi (2004), Eggerston, G. and Woodford, M. (2003), Svenson (2003), McCallum
(2000), and Benhabib, J. Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (1999). Our approach is nei-
ther contrived, nor speciﬁc to the model we use; the same results can be achieved by
several possible relaxations of the linear-quadratic framework. Rather, our point is more
fundamental.
1.2. “Large forecasters”, “endogenous forecasts” and “evidential reasoning”
We shall call a forecast produced by a forecaster who perceives that her individual forecast
has a signiﬁcant aﬀect on the value of the random variable being forecast as an endogenous
forecast. A large forecaster will produce endogenous forecasts.
Evidential reasoning is a well known method of reasoning and inference in the psy-
chological and sociological literature. Unlike under causal reasoning, a forecaster using
evidential reasoning takes her own forecast as evidence of how the other forecasters will
forecast. Therefore, a small forecaster who uses evidential reasoning will behave like a
large forecaster and produce endogenous forecasts.
Evidential reasoning was used by Lewis (1979) to explain cooperation in the one shot
prisoner’s dilemma game. If a player uses causal reasoning then she should defect, because
2defect is a strictly dominant strategy. However, she would realize that mutual defection
is inferior to mutual cooperation. If she uses evidential reasoning, she might take her
preference for mutual cooperation as evidence that her rival also has a preference for
mutual cooperation, in which case, both players cooperate.
Evidential reasoning was also used by Quattrone and Tversky (1984, 1988) to explain
the voting paradox. Given that any one voter is most unlikely to be pivotal, why do so
many people actually vote? The explanation runs something like this. If I do not bother
to vote for my preferred party, then probably most like-minded people will not, and my
preferred party will loose. On the other hand, if I decide to vote then, probably, other
like-minded people will also vote and my preferred party has a better chance of winning.
So I vote. Quattrone and Tversky (1984) show that experimental evidence is supportive of
this view. Hence, these ﬁndings show that, in some circumstances at least, people behave
as though their actions are causal even when they know them to be merely diagnostic or
evidential.
Evidential reasoning can also be used to explain other paradoxes, like giving to charity
and paying for public goods. Another application of evidential reasoning is the following.
According to the Calvinist doctrine of “predestination”, those who are to be saved have
been chosen by God at the beginning of time, and nothing that one can do will lead
to salvation unless one has been chosen. Although, one cannot increase the chances of
salvation by good works, one can produce the evidence of having been chosen by engaging
in acts of piety, devotion to duty, hard work and self denial. According to Max Weber, this
is exactly how millions of people responded to the Calvinist doctrine and why capitalism
developed more quickly in Protestant rather than Catholic countries, an explanation that
is widely accepted in sociology; see for example, Nozick (1993).
1.3. Results and schematic outline
We illustrate our arguments at two levels. First, we use a general, abstract, non-linear
model of an inﬂationary process. Second, we use a simple aggregate supply - aggregate
demand model with a liquidity trap as an illustrative example of a non-linear inﬂationary
process. Individuals produce the optimal inﬂation forecast, given the model, in the sense
of minimizing the mean of the squares of the forecasting errors. We show that, in the
presence of non-linearity in the inﬂation process, and under either of the following two
cases, the optimal forecast of inﬂation is not equal to the mathematical expectation of
inﬂation.
B1. Large forecasters.
B2. Forecasters using evidential reasoning.
3Hence observed departures of the expectations of agents from the mathematical expec-
tation do not necessarily constitute violation of rationality or market eﬃciency.
In our illustrative example, we show that a unique solution always exists under “en-
dogenous forecasting”, which, in the presence of non-linearities, arises under either of the
two cases, B1 or B2, above. However, under some reasonable parameter values, our model
fails to have a solution under “exogenous forecasting”, which results from using, for in-
stance, assumption A1 above. For other, also reasonable, parameter values the solution
under exogenous forecasting exists but diﬀers from that under endogenous forecasting.
Furthermore, our results suggest that published forecasts of inﬂation may be systemati-
cally diﬀerent from the statistical averages of actual inﬂation and output, on average, need
not equal the natural rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Exogenous and endogenous forecasts,
in conjunction with causal and evidential reasoning, are discussed in a general, abstract,
model in Section 2. A speciﬁc model of aggregate demand - aggregate supply with a
liquidity trap is outlined in Section 3 and its results are derived in Section 4 while Section
5 gives some auxiliary results. Section 6 discusses game theoretic foundations in terms of
static and dynamic games with small and large forecasters. It also comments on issues
relating to common knowledge, equilibrium selection, coordination and the game theoretic
consequences of using evidential reasoning. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. All
proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. A General Framework
Consider a forecaster wishing to forecast the level of inﬂation, π. Assume that our fore-
caster chooses the standard criterion, to minimize the sum of squares of the forecasting











where π, the actual rate of inﬂation, is a random variable and depends on the “state
of the world”. πe is the forecaster’s expectation, or prediction of π, and is constant across
“states of the world”. E is the expectation operator that takes expectations across states of
the world. We will allow π to depend on πe, which is the case in standard macroeconomic
models3. The consequences for forecasting, of this dependence of π on πe, will be the main
f o c u so ft h i sp a p e r .
3This is consistent with a wide range of macroeconomic models in which the sequence of moves is
as follows. Economic agents form expectations of inﬂation followed by the realization of some random
shocks. The actual inﬂation rate then materializes, for each possible realization of the random shocks,
and, possibly, as a function of actual monetary/ ﬁscal policies chosen by the appropriate authorities.








However, we shall concentrate on the special case, α =2 , when (2.2) reduces to (2.1).
The latter has several attractive properties, which is probably the reason it has become
standard in the literature and in the practice of forecasting in econometrics, macroeco-
nomics and ﬁnance.










where pi is the probability of state i of the world and πi is the level of inﬂation in that
state. It is only appropriate to use (2.3) if pi is independent of πi.H o w e v e r ,πi may, and












If πe is unrestricted, then minimizing L(πe) is equivalent to setting
dL(πe)













dπe is a constant across states of the world, then (2.5) gives
X∞
i=1 pi (π
e − π)=0 (2.6)
Since,
X∞
i=1 pi (πe − πi)=πe X∞
i=1 pi −
X∞
i=1 piπi = πe − E [π], (2.6) gives the fol-
lowing well known result that forms the basis of much of macroeconomic forecasting,
π
e = E [π] (2.7)
However, if
dπi
dπe is not constant, across states of the world, then the standard implication
of rational expectations, namely (2.7), is not correct; the correct forecasting rule in this
case is given by solving (2.5). These issues are taken up below.
2.1. Macroeconomic forecasting when the inﬂation process is linear
The underlying model of inﬂation could be linear in πe, for instance,
πi = αi + βπ
e, (2.8)
where αi,βare some constants such that β 6=1and β is the same in all states of the world.
52.1.1. Causal reasoning
To explain causal reasoning, consider a large forecaster, for example, a central bank or a
major institution, whose forecast would signiﬁcantly aﬀect expected aggregate inﬂation,
πe. It is reasonable to assume that this forecaster will perceive the eﬀect of its own forecast
on πe and, hence, π. We then say that this forecaster is using causal reasoning because
she, correctly, perceives that her own forecast will have a causal aﬀect on π. For the latter
reason, we say that this forecaster uses endogenous forecasting. Hence, using (2.8),
dπi
dπe = β, (2.9)
which when substituted in (2.5) gives the standard forecasting rule under rational expec-
tations, (2.7).
Now consider a small forecaster, one whose own forecast of π is only an insigniﬁcant
component of expected aggregate inﬂation, πe. If this forecaster uses causal reasoning,
she should conclude that her own forecast has no practical bearing on π.I f a l l o t h e r
forecasters are small, she should also conclude that none of the other forecasters has a




in (2.5) which leads to (2.7).
2.1.2. Evidential reasoning
Suppose now that forecasters (either large or small) use evidential reasoning. Forecasters
using evidential reasoning will take their own forecasts as evidence that others are using
similar forecasts. Hence, each forecaster behaves as if her own individual forecast has a
causal eﬀect on the aggregate forecast, πe.I nt h i sc a s ew es a yf o r e c a s t e r s ,l a r g eo rs m a l l ,
use endogenous forecasts, and hence
dπi
dπe = β,w h i c hw h e ns u b s t i t u t e di n( 2 . 5 )g i v e s( 2 . 7 ) .
The results in this subsection are summarized in the following Proposition
Proposition 1 : When the process of actual inﬂa t i o ni sl i n e a r ,a sd e s c r i b e di n( 2 . 8 ) ,t h e
endogenous and exogenous forecasts are identical and are given by πe = E [π].
Proposition 1 shows that there is no loss in generality with respect to large forecast-
ers and/ or evidential reasoning in using the forecasting rule πe = E [π] provided the
underlying inﬂation process is linear.
62.2. Macroeconomic forecasting when the inﬂation process is non-linear
Suppose that the process of actual inﬂation is non-linear and is given by
π = h(π
e;²)
where h(πe;²) is a non-linear diﬀerentiable function conditional on some vector of random
shocks, ². Hence, while the aggregate inﬂationary expectation, πe, is invariant to the
actual realization of ²,a c t u a li n ﬂation, π, is conditional on the actual realization of ².T h e
analogue of (2.5) in this case is given by
X∞
i=1 pi (π
e − πi)(1− h
0 (π
e; i)) = 0 (2.11)
where  i is the realization of ² in state of the world, i. If a forecaster is small and uses
causal reasoning to produce an exogenous forecast, then h0 =0and so (2.11) reduces to
the standard rational expectation condition (2.7).
However, if the forecaster is large, or uses evidential reasoning (despite being small)
then in each case the forecaster believes that her individual forecast will have an aﬀect
on the aggregate forecast and so h0 (πe; i) 6=0 . Such forecasters are said to be using
“endogenous” forecasts. In this case, (2.11) is the correct forecasting rule. It does not
reduce to (2.6) and, therefore, (2.7) is not the correct forecasting rule in general.
The results in this subsection are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 : In a model with two states of the world, when the process of actual inﬂa-
tion is non-linear in aggregate inﬂationary expectation, πe, the endogenous and exogenous
forecasts are diﬀerent i.e. endogenous forecasts will imply πe 6= E [π].
The proof does not extend to a world with more than two states of nature. For example,
s u p p o s et h a tw eh a v et h r e es t a t e so ft h ew o r l di nw h i c h² takes respective values  1,  2
























e; 3)) = 0
(2.12)
Even if h0 (πe; 1) 6= h0 (πe; 2), then (2.12) can still hold if h0 (πe; 3) has a suitable
value, but this is very unlikely to occur. This can be stated formally as follows. In a
suitable measure space of models, the set of counterexamples to Proposition 2 (with more
than two states) is of measure zero.
Insofar as one believes in the presence of large forecasters in the economy, such as
central banks, and/ or in the psychological evidence on evidential reasoning, then, relaxing
the restrictiveness of linear inﬂation processes clearly identiﬁes the inappropriateness of
7the traditionally used rule of rational expectations, πe = E [π]. Indeed, in this case,
πe = E [π] could coincide with irrational expectations, because it could be inconsistent
with optimization behavior, while the correct forecasting rule is given by solving (2.11).
This has fundamental implications for macroeconomic forecasting and for tests of rational
expectations and market eﬃciency, which have equated departures from πe = E [π] with
violations of rationality.
Although, Muth (1961) relied on linear inﬂation processes for all his results, he showed
acute awareness of the possibility that the inﬂation process could be non-linear as the
following general deﬁnition of rational expectations in the same paper reveals. “The hy-
pothesis can be rephrased a little more precisely as follows: that expectations of ﬁrms...tend
to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the
“objective” probability distributions of outcomes).” Muth (1961: pp.316). However, even
this deﬁnition is clearly inadequate as a description of (2.5) or (2.11) because Muth was
interested in a single representative forecaster, while more interesting game theoretic issues
arise in our model; see Section 6 below.
One might pose the following question. Given that macroeconomic departures from
equilibrium are usually only of the order of a few percent, why can we not use a linear-
quadratic approximation, in which case the expectation rule πe = E [π] might be a tolerable
approximation? We have the following two answers.
1. If the model equations are not analytic (i.e. do not have a Taylor expansion), then
the linear-quadratic approximation is not valid. This is the case with our illustrative
example in Section 3 below.
2. Even if the equations were analytic, linearizing the behavioral equations (as is often
done, explicitly or implicitly) is not correct. What should be linearized are the
ﬁnal form equations. Linearizing the behavioral equations can radically alter the
dynamics of the model.
3. An Example: Model
3.1. Background to the model
As an illustrative example, we use an aggregate supply - aggregate demand macroeco-
nomic model with a liquidity trap. The liquidity trap introduces a non-linearity, which
causes exogenous and endogenous forecasts to be diﬀerent, for some parameter values (see
Proposition 2). In our example, as we shall see below, non-linearity takes the speciﬁcf o r m
πi = αi + βiπ
e
where βi is now the value of β (compare with (2.8)) in state i of the world.
8An interesting feature of the model is that, for some reasonable parameter values, a
solution under exogenous forecasts does not exist. On the other hand, a unique solution
under endogenous forecasts always exists. So this example forces the issue: it is vital to
consider endogenous forecasts.
3.2. Structure of the economy
The four main equations of the model are the following: an aggregate demand equation,
an aggregate supply equation, a social welfare function and a forecaster’s loss function.
Aggregate demand and supply are given by, respectively
AD : y = f − (i − π
e)+  (3.1)
AS : y = π − π
e (3.2)
where y is the deviation of aggregate output from the natural level of output. f is
a ﬁscal policy variable. For example, f>0 could be a ﬁscal deﬁcit and f<0,aﬁscal
surplus. The deﬁcit could either be debt ﬁnanced or money ﬁnanced. Alternatively, f
could also be a proxy for a temporary balanced budget reallocation of taxes and subsidies
that has a net expansionary (f>0) or contractionary (f<0)e ﬀect; see for instance Dixit
and Lambertini (2000). i ≥ 0 is the nominal interest rate, π i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation, and πe
is expected inﬂation. Hence, i − πe is the real rate of interest. The instruments of policy
are i and f.   is a demand shock4 that takes two values, 1,−1, with equal probability,
hence
E [ ]=0 , Va r[ ]=1 . (3.3)
The aggregate demand equation reﬂects the fact that demand is increasing in the ﬁscal
impulse, f, and decreasing in the real interest rate; it is also aﬀe c t e db yd e m a n ds h o c k s .
The aggregate supply equation shows that deviations of output around the natural rate are
caused by unexpected movements in the rate of inﬂation; a formulation that is widespread
in the policy literature on rational expectations.
A number of models in the literature on monetary and ﬁscal policy interaction can
provide microfoundations for (3.1) and (3.2); see for instance Dixit and Lambertini (2000).
Variations of the model in (3.1) and (3.2) are also used by Ceccheti (2000), Lambertini
and Rovelli (2003) and Uhlig (2002). Our intent, therefore, is to use a fairly standard
model in the macroeconomic policy literature to formally illustrate our arguments. The
4We could also introduce a supply shock; this merely complicates the algebra without changing the
conclusions. The modern literature on the liquidity trap stresses demand over supply shocks as major
contributory factors.
9microfoundations rely on some form of wage-price rigidity. On the other hand, in our
model, the nominal interest rate, i, is completely ﬂexible in the region i>0. Hence, for a
suﬃciently negative shock, the equilibrium real interest rate may be negative5.
Note the absence of parameters in (3.1),(3.2). This is because our conclusions do not
qualitatively depend on the values of such parameters. So we have suppressed them to
improve readability.
3.3. Preferences of the policymaker
We assume that a unitary authority, the Treasury, controls both ﬁscal and monetary policy










2; yF ≥ 0 (3.4)
where yF is the diﬀerence between desired output and the natural rate, hence, we allow
desired output to be diﬀerent from the natural rate. The ﬁrst term captures the cost to
society from output being diﬀerent from its desired level, yF. The second term reﬂects
losses that are quadratic in the inﬂation rate, relative to the desired rate of zero inﬂation.
The use of the ﬁscal instrument, f, is more costly than the use of the monetary instrument,
i6. We model this as imposing a strictly positive cost of ﬁscal policy, equal to f2, but no
cost of using the monetary policy7.
We assume that the Treasury aims to maximize society’s welfare function (3.4) (we
ignore the important question of whether this is true or, indeed, if such a social welfare
function can be constructed, however, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)).
Our model contains only one parameter, yF. We could complicate the model by in-
cluding further parameters, a general probability distribution for the shocks, international
trade, structural dynamics etc. However, none of these aﬀect our story.
3.4. Objective of private forecasters












5We conjecture that the combination of rigid wages-prices and a ﬂexible nominal interest rate has the
eﬀect that the real interest rate, i − πe, overshoots so as to equilibrate the economy.
6Fiscal policy is typically more cumbersome to alter, on account of the cost of changing it (balanced
budget requirements, lobby groups etc.) while monetary policy is more ﬂexible and less costly to alter.
Indeed the monetary policy committee in the UK as well as the Fed in the USA meet on a regular basis
to make decisions on the interest rate and one observes a much greater frequency of interest rate changes
relative to tax/debt changes.
7Strictly speaking, for our qualitative results to hold, we only require that ﬁscal policy be relatively
more expensive than the (possibly strictly positive) cost of using monetary policy. Normalising the cost
of using monetary policy to zero, however, ensures greater tractability and transparency of the results.
10where E is the expectation operator that is taken over the two states of the world
arising from   =1and   = −1.
We will concentrate on the discretionary solution. This is because our main focus is
on the eﬀect of diﬀerent forecasting rules rather than on the problems associated with the
time-inconsistency of the optimal solution and the large number of proposals to deal with
it; see for instance, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
3.5. Sequence of Moves
The sequence of moves is as follows. First, the private sector forms its expectations, πe,
of inﬂation, π, synonymous with the signing of nominal wage contracts in anticipation of
future inﬂation. The demand shock,  , is then realized (  = ±1 with equal probability).
Finally, the Treasury chooses the optimal values of the policy variables, f, i,g i v e nπe and
 .T h e s em o v e sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e3 . 1 .
Figure 3.1: Sequence Of Moves
3.6. Reduced Form Equations
Equating aggregate demand and supply from (3.1) and (3.2), we get our reduced form
equations for output and inﬂation.
y = f − i + π
e +   (3.6)
π = f − i +2 π
e +   (3.7)





(f − i + π




(f − i +2 π
e +  )
2 − f
2 (3.8)
113.7. Method of Solution
We solve the model backwards. First, we determine f,i as functions of πe and   by
maximizing social welfare (3.8). This corresponds to the Treasury’s actions. We then
work out πe, using (3.7) and the “correct” forecasting rule, which is found by minimizing
(3.5); we also contrast this with the standard use of rational expectations, πe = E [π].
This corresponds to the calculations of the private sector.
The partial derivatives of W with respect to f,i are given by:
∂W
∂f
= yF − 2  − 4f − 3π
e +2 i (3.9)
∂W
∂i
=2 f − 2i +3 π
e +2   − yF (3.10)

















However, the nominal interest rate is constrained to be non-negative. Hence, the






=0 ,, i ≥ 0 (3.12)
Using (3.12) in conjunction with (3.10) it follows that







yF +   (not liquidity trapped) (3.13)
i =0 (liquidity trapped) (3.14)
Since (3.11) always holds (because f is unrestricted), we can use it to eliminate f from










yF − i +   (3.15)








yF +1(not liquidity trapped) (3.16)
f =0(not liquidity trapped) (3.17)
12while if it is liquidity trapped,












From (3.16), (3.17) we see that when the economy is not liquidity trapped, then the
Treasury stabilizes the economy by exclusively using, the less expensive, monetary policy.
However, from (3.18), (3.19), when the economy is liquidity trapped, then monetary policy
is impotent and the Treasury is forced to use the costly ﬁscal policy.
The following notation will be convenient. f+,i +,y +,π+,W +,L+ denote the values of
f,i,y,π,W,L when the good state of the world,   =1 , occurs. Similarly, f−,i −,y −,π−,W −,L−
denote the values of f,i,y,π,W,L when the bad state of the world,   = −1, occurs.









2y− and so on.
On the other hand, we shall use πe exclusively to denote the optimal forecast of π.S o ,










π− (exogenous forecasts) (3.20)



























The solution is now examined under the two cases of exogenous and endogenous forecasts.
4.1. Solution under exogenous forecasts
Under exogenous forecasting, each agent takes π as given exogenously, independent of the
method she uses for forecasting. Suppose that a generic variable, x, takes respective values
x− and x+ when respectively   = −1 and   =1 . Recall that we have chosen to denote the







Note that the average value
_
x need not be equal to the forecasted value of x which is given
13by xe. This distinction turns out to be important in interpreting the diﬀerences between
results arising from exogenous and endogenous forecasts respectively.
As shown in Proposition 1, an agent using exogenous forecasts relies on the forecasting
rule πe = E [π]. The most important result in this section is that there might be no
optimal solution if agents use exogenous forecasting; this is shown in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 :I fyF < 1
2 then there is no (optimal) solution under exogenous forecast-
ing.
Contingent on parameter values, the economy may or may not be liquidity trapped
under exogenous forecasts. For completeness, these cases are considered in the auxiliary
results in Section 5.1.
4.2. Solution under endogenous forecasts
Here we consider the case where forecasters perceive the dependence of π on their own
method of forecasting. This could arise from a variety of cases, such as the following. (1)
Some forecasters are large, such as central banks and some ﬁnancial institutions. If there
are small forecasters they simply follow the large forecasters. (2) Forecasters (large or
small) use evidential reasoning rather than causal reasoning.
Because the underlying process of inﬂation is non-linear in our example, it follows from
Proposition 2 that (2.7) is not the correct forecasting rule. If πe is not restricted, then the
correct forecasting rule can be found by solving (2.5). The results are as follows.
Proposition 4 :I f0 ≤ yF < 1, then the economy is liquidity trapped for   = −1 but not
for   =1. The solution in this case is given by
² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− =0 i+ = 1
5 (8 + 2yF) > 0
_
i = 1
5 (4 + yF) > 0
f− = 1
5(1 − yF) > 0 f+ =0
_
f = 1
10(1 − yF) > 0
y− = 2
5(yF − 1) < 0 y+ = 1
5(yF − 1) < 0
_
y = 3
10(yF − 1) < 0
π− = yF ≥ 0 π+ = 1
5(1 + 4yF) > 0
_
π = 1
10(1 + 9yF) > 0
W− = − 1
25 (3 + 4yF +1 8 y2
F) W+ = − 1
25 (1 + 8yF +1 6 y2
F)
_
W = − 1
25 (2 + 6yF +1 7 y2
F)
i− − πe = −1
5 (2 + 3yF) < 0 i+ − πe = 1
5 (6 − yF) > 0 ie − πe = 2
5(1 − yF) > 0
Furthermore, the aggregate expectation of inﬂation is given by πe = 1





π<π e is interesting. The economic intuition behind this result is as follows.
Under discretion, the Treasury accommodates higher inﬂation expectations with higher
actual inﬂation. In turn, higher actual inﬂation results in a higher forecast of inﬂation.
14This positive feedback is internalized by endogenous forecasts. However, it is absent in
exogenous forecasts because the forecasters take inﬂation as an exogenous random variable,
unaﬀected by inﬂation expectations.
If this result is generally true, then published forecasts of inﬂation may be systemati-
cally diﬀerent from the statistical averages of actual inﬂation.
Another interesting result is that output is below the natural rate in each state of
the world, and on average. Thus, discretionary policy can be deﬂationary when there
is the possibility of a liquidity trap. This runs counter to the standard result in nat-
ural rate models with exogenous forecasts that
_
y =0 . More generally, in a non-linear
rational expectations model with endogenous forecasting, average output need not be at
the natural rate. This has clear implications for estimating the natural rate of output
based on aggregate output data. In particular, the natural rate should not be estimated
using purely statistical methods but, rather, should be estimated using an appropriately
speciﬁed macroeconomic model.
The case yF ≥ 1 is less interesting because the economy is not liquidity trapped at
all in this case and so the non-linearity in the inﬂation process disappears. This result is
presented in the auxiliary results in Section 5.2.
P r o p o s i t i o n4f o r m a l i z e st h em a i nr e s u l to ft h i ss e c t i o ni nt e r m so fas i m p l eb u tw i d e l y
used model in macroeconomics that allows for the possibility of a liquidity trap. It suggests
that empirical rejections of πe =
_
π do not necessarily constitute a failing of rational
expectations. Indeed in the presence of non-linear inﬂation processes, and either of the
following two assumptions, large forecasters or evidential reasoning, an empirical ﬁnding
of πe =
_
π may constitute a violation of rational expectations.
5. Auxiliary Results
5.1. Auxiliary results under exogenous forecasts
The two propositions below complete the solution to the model in the case of exogenous
forecasts.
Proposition 5 :I f1
2 ≤ yF < 1, then the economy is liquidity trapped for   = −1 but not
for   =1 . The complete solution is given by
15² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− =0 i+ =4 yF − 2
_
i =2 yF − 1
f− =2( 1− yF) f+ =0
_
f =1− yF
y− = yF − 1 y+ =1− yF
_
y =0
π− =4 yF − 3 π+ =2 yF − 1
_
π =3 yF − 2=πe
W− =2 0 yF − 12y2
F − 9 W+ =4 yF − 4y2
F − 1
_




π =2− 3yF i+ −
_
π = yF ie −
_
π =1− yF
Furthermore, when   = −1,
∂W−
∂i− =4( yF − 1).
Proposition 6 :I fyF ≥ 1, then the economy is not liquidity trapped in either state. The
solution in this case is given by
² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− = yF − 1 > 0 i+ =1+yF
_
i = yF
f− =0 f+ =0
_
f =0
y− =0 y+ =0
_
y =0
π− = yF π+ = yF
_
π = yF = πe
W− = −y2







π = −1 i+ −
_
π =1 ie −
_
π =0
5.2. Auxiliary results under endogenous forecasts
Proposition 7 :I fyF ≥ 1, then the economy is not liquidity trapped in either state. The
results are as in Proposition 6. i.e. the same as under exogenous forecasts.
In the cases considered in Propositions 5 and 6, the non-linearity in the inﬂation process
disappears and so, as claimed in the general model (see Proposition 1),
_
π = πe.F u r t h e r -
more,
_
y =0unlike Proposition (4) where it is negative.
6. Game Theoretic Foundations: Common knowledge, equilibrium
selection and evidential reasoning
An u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent game theoretic foundations can support Proposition 3-7. These are
discussed in sections 6.1 to 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses problems of common knowledge,
equilibrium selection and coordination in the context of the model of this paper. All this
is carried out in a completely classical game theoretic framework. Section 6.4 discusses
the consequences of evidential reasoning for these issues, thus introducing an element of
behavioral game theory.
166.1. Static games
In the simplest game theoretic formulation we have two players. One of the players is
the Treasury who controls both ﬁscal and monetary instruments f, i and whose payoﬀ is
social welfare, W, given by (3.4). The second player is the private sector, treated as a single
player, who chooses her expectation of inﬂation, πe, so as to minimize her forecasting loss
function (2.1).
The timing of events is given by Figure 3.1. First, the private sector chooses πe.
Next, nature chooses  . Finally, the Treasury chooses f, i. However, if πe is unknown to
the Treasury when it chooses f, i then, technically, this is a simultaneous move game.
Analogously, when the private sector chooses πe, it does not know whether the payoﬀ of
the Treasury is W+ or W− (corresponding to   =1or   = −1, respectively).
Hence, this is a static game of incomplete information and the relevant solution concept
is “Bayesian Nash equilibrium”. However, there is only one type for the private sector,
hence, Bayes law automatically holds. Thus any Nash equilibrium of this game is also a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
Since the above game is static, it follows that, in a Nash equilibrium, the private sector
takes f+,f −,i +,i −, and hence π+,π−, as given. Thus, all forecasts are “exogenous”. There
are two Nash equilibria for yF > 1
2 but one of them strictly Pareto dominates the other. It
is the “Pareto dominant equilibrium” that is reported in Proposition 5 (for 1
2 ≤ yF < 1)
and Proposition 6 (for yF ≥ 1). For yF < 1
2, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
for this game; a fact reported in Proposition 3.
Now let us suppose that the private sector, infact, consists of many forecasters. Suppose
that the Treasury observes none of these forecasts, nor the aggregate forecast when it
chooses f, i. Then the analysis and the results are still exactly as above.
6.2. Dynamic games with small forecasters
Suppose the private sector consists of a large number of forecasters, each of them small.
Suppose they all move simultaneously, forming their forecasts independently and before
the realization of the demand shock,  . Suppose that the Treasury chooses f, i having
observed the realization of the demand shock,  , a n dh a v i n go b s e r v e dt h ef o r e c a s t so fa l l
forecasters.
This is clearly a dynamic game. It is a game of incomplete information because when
each member of the private sector chooses her forecasts, she does not know whether the
payoﬀ of the Treasury is W+ or W− (corresponding to   =1or   = −1, respectively).
Hence the relevant solution concept is the “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” or one of its
reﬁnements. Each player moves just once. Each member of the private sector is of one
type. The Treasury, however, is of two types, W+, W− but moves after the private sector.
17From these considerations, it follows that Bayes law is automatically satisﬁed. Thus, any
subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is also a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Since each forecaster is small she perceives, correctly, that her own forecast is only
an insigniﬁcant component of the aggregate forecast, πe. Hence she, correctly, perceives
that her own individual forecast has no practical eﬀect on πe and, hence, π. Therefore,
each forecaster takes π as given, exactly as in the static model of Section 6.1, despite the
dynamic nature of the present model. Thus, forecasters produce exogenous forecasts and
we have exactly the same outcomes as in Section 6.1, and Propositions 3, 5, 6, again hold.
Now suppose the Treasury observes aggregate πe but not the individual forecasts of
the private sector. The relevant solution concept is now the “perfect public equilibrium”.
However, the outcomes are exactly as above, and are described in Propositions 3, 5, 6.
6.3. Dynamic games with large forecasters
Reconsider the dynamic game of Section 6.2 but with the private sector now treated as
a single player. The private sector is now a large forecaster who, correctly, perceives the
dependence of π on her forecast πe. Hence, she produces endogenous forecasts.
The private sector is of a single type and moves just once, at the start of the game.
T h eT r e a s u r y ,w h i c hi so ft w ot y p e s ,W+, W−, moves subsequent to the private sector and
after having observed πe. Hence, this is a dynamic game of perfect, though incomplete
information. Hence it always has a subgame perfect equilibrium (which is automatically a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, see Section 6.2). This equilibrium can be found by backward
induction and is, infact, unique. It is reported in Proposition 4 (for 0 ≤ yF < 1)a n d
Proposition 7 (for yF ≥ 1).
Suppose the private sector consists of many players but just one (large) forecaster, e.g.,
the Central Bank. First, the forecaster forms her forecast of inﬂation, πe, and makes it
public. Second, the other players make their decisions having observed πe but before the
Treasury chooses f, i. Finally, the Treasury chooses f, i having observed πe. Just as above,
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium whose outcome is described by Proposition
4( f o r0 ≤ yF < 1) and Proposition 7 (for yF ≥ 1).
However, if there is more than one large forecaster, then the game theoretic interactions
between the players have to be remodelled with results, not necessarily, as above. But this
l i e sb e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h i sp a p e r .
6.4. Common knowledge, equilibrium selection and coordination
Common knowledge of the game is an implicit assumption above, as it is in classical game
theory. This means that each player knows the game being played, knows that all other
players know the game being played, knows that all players know that all other players
18know that all players know the game being played and so ad inﬁnitum. The common
knowledge assumption is a strong one to make. Furthermore, if players do not have
common knowledge of the game being played at the outset, it is diﬃcult to see how they
can arrive at it.
Quite frequently a game has more than one equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium se-
lection criteria are needed. This is one of the motivations behind the ‘reﬁnements of the
Nash’ programme. These selection criteria have to be part of the common knowledge of
the game.
If we have just one large forecaster, whose forecast is made public before the other
players take their decisions, then our model has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
described by Propositions 4, 7 (see section 6.3 above).
On the other hand we get multiple equilibria in each of the following two cases: (1) all
forecasters are small, (2) forecasters are large or small but forecasts are not observed by
the Treasury when it sets f, i. However, in the ﬁrst case, payoﬀ dominance selects a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium (section 6.2 above) and in the second case, payoﬀ dominance
also selects a unique Nash equilibrium (section 6.1 above).
Of course, many games have multiple equilibria that are not Pareto ranked. Moreover,
even when “payoﬀ dominance” is applicable, it can be in conﬂict with other selection cri-
teria, for example, “risk dominance”. A major theme in game theory has been the search
for an acceptable equilibrium selection criterion. A notable candidate is the equilibrium
selection procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) which will always select a unique equi-
librium. However, Norde, Potters, Reijnierse and Vermeulen (1996) show that the only
solution concept that satisﬁes consistency, nonemptiness and one-person rationality is that
of Nash. So if one thinks that these properties are desirable then one has to be pessimistic
about the success of the equilibrium selection programme.
Over and above the problem of equilibrium selection, there is the problem of coordi-
nation. Even if there were a preferred equilibrium, how can the players coordinate their
actions to achieve the desired outcome?
6.5. Consequence of evidential reasoning
Suppose that each player knows the game, and uses “evidential reasoning”. Each player
will take her knowledge of the game as evidence that the other players also know the
game. Since she now knows that other players also know the game, she will take this
latter conclusion as evidence that each of the other players knows that all players know
that all players know the game and so on ad inﬁnitum. In short, private knowledge of the
game together with evidential reasoning implies common knowledge of the game.
One can speculate on the emergence of evidential reasoning (which is irrational) and
19its survival alongside causal reasoning (which is rational). In a large number of appli-
cations, private knowledge of the game is inadequate for action. The players also need
common knowledge of the game. As an example, consider the following version of the
well known “coordinated attack” problem; see for instance, Halpern (1986). (W)ellington
and (B)lucher wish to attack their common enemy (N)apoleon. If W or B attack on their
own, N will win. But if W or B attack together, they will win. W sends a message to B
saying he will attack, but only if he receives conﬁrmation from B that B will also attack.
B replies that he will attack, but only if he receives conﬁrmation that his message has
reached W, and so on. Under causal reasoning, neither W or B would attack. However,
under evidential reasoning, W and B will both attack because each uses his own reasoning
as evidence that the other is similarly minded (and, maybe, a ﬁnite number of messages
is suﬃcient to enforce this psychological mode of reasoning)8.
Thus evidential reasoning, while not a logically correct method of reasoning may, nev-
ertheless, have practical utility.
Evidential reasoning can help small players behave strategically. Assume that all fore-
casters are small. If they use causal reasoning then they will produce exogenous forecasts.
Consequently, an equilibrium may not exist (see Proposition 3). However, if they use evi-
dential reasoning then they will behave as a single large forecaster and produce endogenous
forecasts for which a unique equilibrium exists in our model (see Propositions 4, 7).
Evidential reasoning can also change a static game into a dynamic game. Reconsider
the static games of section 6.1. Although πe is determined before the Treasury sets f, i the
Treasury sets its policies without knowledge of πe. However, the Treasury can calculate
πe, and know what it is, without observing it. The calculation of πe by the Treasury can
itself be foreseen by each forecaster. This can be seen as evidence by each forecaster that
the Treasury will behave as if it observes πe.
Finally, evidential reasoning can lead to the sustainability of the non-Nash outcomes.
For example, the cooperative outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma game, discussed in section
1.2.
To summarize, evidential reasoning can help establish common knowledge of the game,
in coordinating players, in enabling small players to behave strategically, can turn static
games into dynamic games and can sustain non-Nash outcomes.
7. Conclusions
Rational expectations is almost always taken to mean that, given the information set and
the relevant economic theory, the expectation formed by an economic agent, of a random
8Eventually, Wellington and Blucher did attack Napoleon with decisive consequences in the Battle of
Waterloo.
20variable, should be equal to its mathematical expectation. This is only true if the process
governing inﬂation is linear in the aggregate inﬂationary expectations.
For many problems, especially where the underlying structure is not linear-quadratic,
however, actual inﬂation might be non-linear in expectations of inﬂation. In this case, if
either forecasters are large, or use evidential reasoning (despite being large or small) then
the optimal forecast does not equal the mathematical expectation of the variable being
forecast. Indeed, under these circumstances, an observation of the forecast being equal
to its mathematical expectation could constitute a violation of rational expectations; the
correct general forecasting equation that is consistent with rational expectations is then
given by (2.11).
We show in our illustrative example that there might be no solution to the model if
rational expectations are interpreted as equating expectations with the average, while there
is a solution using the correct forecasting rule. This clearly has serious implications for
the existence of solutions if rational expectations is interpreted as
_
π = πe.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
results suggest that published forecasts of inﬂation may be systematically diﬀerent from
the statistical averages of actual inﬂation and output, on average, need not equal the
natural rate.
In order to demonstrate our results, we use a simple, standard, model of aggregate
demand - aggregate supply with a liquidity trap, which gives rise to non-linearities in the
inﬂation process. We also illustrate our arguments by using a general, abstract, framework
where inﬂation is a non-linear function of inﬂation expectations. Several possible depar-
tures from the linear-quadratic framework, which typiﬁes a large literature on macroeco-
nomic policy, could have been used to derive our results. However, our chosen exposition
is much simpler, tractable and topical. Variants of the model that we use have been used
recently in several papers that examine the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy,
hence, our example is not contrived. The paper has deep, fundamental, implications for
forecasting using rational expectations in several areas, but, in particular macroeconomics
and ﬁnance.
8. Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Suppose that the process of actual inﬂation is described in (2.8). If forecasts are
endogenous then
dπi
dπe = β, which when substituted into (2.5), gives (2.7), and so πe = E [π].
When forecasts are exogenous (2.10) holds, which when substituted into (2.5), gives (2.7),
and so πe = E [π],o n c ea g a i n .¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
21Suppose that there are only two states of the world in which ² takes values  1 and  2.














e; 2)) = 0 (8.1)






which implies that the actual process of inﬂation is linear, as in (2.8). However, this
contradicts the assumption of a non-linear inﬂation process and, hence, establishes Propo-
sition 2.¥
As preparation for the proofs of the main propositions under exogenous and endogenous
forecasts we ﬁrst give the intermediate results in Lemmas 1 through 4.
Lemma 1 : If the economy is liquidity trapped in the good state,   =1 ,t h e ni ti sa l s o
liquidity trapped in the bad state,   = −1.




















yF − i− − 1 (8.3)
Suppose that the economy is liquidity trapped in the good state,   =1 . We start by
showing that
∂W+
∂i+ < 0,f o ra l li+ ≥ 0. Suppose not. Then
∂W+
∂i+ ≥ 0 for some i+ = i0 ≥ 0.
From (8.2) we get 3
2πe − 1
2yF − i0 +1≥ 0,i 0 ≥ 0, hence, 3
2πe − 1
2yF +1≥ 0. Consider
i+ = 3
2πe−1











This means that the economy is not liquidity trapped in the good state,   =1 , contrary
to the assumption of the lemma. Hence,
∂W+
∂i+ < 0 for all i+ ≥ 0, as claimed. In particular,
for i+ =0 , (8.2) now gives 3
2πe − 1
2yF +1< 0. Hence, also, 3
2πe − 1
2yF − 1 < 0.T h u s ,
3
2πe − 1
2yF −i− −1 < 0, for all i− ≥ 0, which establishes that the economy is also liquidity
trapped in the bad state,   = −1.¥
From Lemma 1 it follows that if the economy is not liquidity trapped in the bad state,
  = −1, it is not liquidity trapped in the good state either, Hence, we have 3, and only 3,
cases to consider.
1. The economy is liquidity trapped in the good state.
2. The economy is not liquidity trapped in the bad state.
223. The economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state but not in the good state.
These three cases are covered in Lemmas 2 - 4 below.
Lemma 2 : If the economy is liquidity trapped in the good state,   =1 , then
(a) dπ




(b) Exogenous and endogenous forecasts are the same and given by πe =
_
π = −yF.
(c) yF > 1
2.
(d) The full set of results is given by
² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− =0 i+ =0
_
i =0
f− = yF + 1









π− = −yF − 1
2 π+ = −yF + 1
2
_













i− − πe = yF i+ − πe = yF ie − πe = yF
Furthermore, the magnitude of the forecasters loss is given by L = 1
8.
Proof: From Lemma 1, the economy is liquidity trapped in both states of the world.
Hence, (3.18), (3.19) apply in both states of the world. Substituting from (3.18), (3.19),











 , ∀  (8.4)
Part (a) follows from (8.4). Part (b) then follows from Proposition 1 and taking
expectations of both sides of (8.4), then solving for πe. Part (c) follows from the requirement
that
∂W+
∂i+ < 0 at i+ =0 . Finally, part (d) follows from part (b), (3.18), (3.19) and (3.6) -
(3.8). Substituting π−,π+,πe in (2.1), one obtains the magnitude of the forecaster’s loss.
¥
Lemma 3 : If the economy is not liquidity trapped in the bad state,   = −1, then
(a) dπ
dπe is constant across states of the world and π = 1
2πe + 1
2yF.
(b) Exogenous and endogenous forecasts are the same and given by πe =
_
π = yF.
(c) yF ≥ 1.
(d) The full set of results is given by
² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− = yF − 1 i+ = yF +1
_
i = yF
f− =0 f+ =0
_
f =0
y− =0 y+ =0
_
y =0
π− = yF π+ = yF
_
π = yF = πe
W− = −y2





i− − πe = −1 i+ − πe =1 ie − πe =0
23Furthermore, the magnitude of the forecasters loss is given by L =0 .
Proof: From Lemma 1, the economy is not liquidity trapped in either state of the world.
Hence, (3.16), (3.17) apply in both states of the world. Substituting from (3.16), (3.17),








yF, ∀  (8.5)
Part (a) follows from (8.5). Part (b) follows from Proposition 1 and taking expectations
of both sides of (8.5), then solving for πe. Part (c) follows from the requirement that i− ≥ 0.
Finally, part (d) follows from (3.16), (3.17) and (3.6) - (3.8). Substituting π−,π+,πe in
(2.1), one obtains the magnitude of the forecaster’s loss.¥
Lemma 4 : If the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state,   = −1, but not in the
good state,   =1 , then,
(a) dπ



















(  = −1)
(b) Exogenous and endogenous forecasts are diﬀerent.
(c) For exogenous forecasts
(i) πe =
_
π =3 yF − 2
(ii) 1
2 ≤ yF < 1
(iii) The full set of results under exogenous forecasts are given by
² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− =0 i+ =4 yF − 2
_
i =2 yF − 1
f− =2( 1− yF) f+ =0
_
f =1− yF
y− = yF − 1 y+ =1− yF
_
y =0
π− =4 yF − 3 π+ =2 yF − 1
_
π =3 yF − 2=πe
W− =2 0 yF − 12y2
F − 9 W+ =4 yF − 4y2
F − 1
_
W =1 2 yF − 8y2
F − 5
i− − πe =2− 3yF i+ − πe = yF ie − πe =1− yF
Furthermore, the magnitude of the forecasters loss is given by L = 1
2 (1 − yF)
2.
(d) For endogenous forecasts








(iii) yF < 1
(iv) The full set of results are given by
24² = −1 ² = 1
_
²= 0
i− =0 i+ = 1
5 (8 + 2yF)
_
i = 1
5 (4 + yF)
f− = 1















W− = − 1
25 (3 + 4yF +1 8 y2
F) W+ = − 1
25 (1 + 8yF +1 6 y2
F)
_
W = − 1
25 (2 + 6yF +1 7 y2
F)
i− − πe = −1
5 (2 + 3yF) i+ − πe = 1
5 (6 − yF) ie − πe = 2
5(1 − yF)
Furthermore, the magnitude of the forecasters loss is given by L = 1
20 (1 − yF)
2 ≤ 1
20.
Proof: Since the economy is not liquidity trapped in the good state,   =1 , we substitute








yF (  =1 ) (8.6)
Since the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state,   = −1, we substitute from











(  = −1) (8.7)
Part (a) follows from (8.6), (8.7). Part (b) then follows from Proposition 1 and is
veriﬁed by direct calculation below.
Part c(i) follows from substituting for π+,π − from (8.6), (8.7) into (3.20), then solving
for πe(=
_






< 0 and i+ ≥ 0 lead to c(ii). Part c(iii)
follows from c(i), (3.16) - (3.19) and (3.6) - (3.8). Substituting π−,π+,πe in (2.1), one
obtains the magnitude of the forecaster’s loss, 1
2 (1 − yF)
2.












0. Finally d(iv) follows from d(i), (3.16) - (3.19) and (3.6) - (3.8). Substituting π−,π +,πe
in (2.1), one obtains the magnitude of the forecaster’s loss, 1
20 (1 − yF)
2.¥
Proof of Proposition 3
We have 3, and only 3, cases to consider.
1. The economy is liquidity trapped in the good state.
2. The economy is not liquidity trapped in the bad state.
3. The economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state but not in the good state.
25These three cases are covered by Lemmas 3 to 4, respectively. From Lemma 2(e),
yF > 1
2. From Lemma 3(c), yF ≥ 1. From Lemma 4c(ii), 1
2 ≤ yF < 1. Hence, for yF < 1
2,
none of the three cases apply and Proposition 3 follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
If 0 ≤ yF ≤ 1
2, then only Lemma 4(d) applies and Proposition 4 follows. If 1
2 <
yF < 1, then both Lemmas 2 and 4(d) apply. The forecaster’s loss under Lemma 4(d) is
1
20 (1 − yF)
2 ≤ 1
20 which is clearly less than the forecaster’s loss under Lemma 2, which is
L = 1
8. Hence, the forecaster chooses πe = 3
5yF + 2
5 from Lemma 4d (i). Since the Treasury
chooses f, i having observed πe, it chooses f, i a sg i v e ni nL e m m a4 d( i v ) .¥
Proof of Proposition 5
Since 1
2 ≤ yF < 1, Lemma 3 clearly does not apply, i.e., the economy must be liquidity
trapped in, at least, one state of the world. For yF = 1
2, only Lemma 4(c) applies. For
1
2 <y F < 1, both Lemmas 2 and 4(c) apply. A simple calculation shows that the payoﬀ
to a forecaster, and also to each type of Treasury (W+,W −), is higher under the solution
of Lemma 4(c) than it is for the solution to Lemma 2. If we adopt payoﬀ dominance as
our selection criterion, then we select the solution of 4(c).
We need a method of coordination between the players. Here evidential reasoning
can help in the following manner. The Treasury selects the payoﬀ dominant solution.
It takes this as evidence that each member of the private sector will likewise select the
payoﬀ dominant solution. Furthermore, each member of the private sector takes her own
calculation as evidence that all other players are carrying out similar calculations.
Actually, there are inﬁnitely many solutions, depending on the fraction of the popula-
tion believing whether the economy will be liquidity trapped in both states of the world
or just the bad state. However, “payoﬀ dominance” will select the solution where the
economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only.¥
Proof of Proposition 6
Since yF ≥ 1, Lemmas 2 and 3 apply but not Lemma 4. A simple calculation shows
that it is the solution to Lemma 3 that satisﬁes payoﬀ dominance. Selecting that solution
establishes Proposition 6. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7
Since yF ≥ 1, Lemmas 2 and 3 apply but not Lemma 4. A forecaster’s loss under
Lemma 3, L =0 , is clearly less than under Lemma 2, which is L = 1
8.H e n c e , t h e
forecaster chooses πe = yF from Lemma 3(b). Since the Treasury chooses f, i having
observed πe, it chooses f, i as given in Lemma 3d. ¥
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